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Chapter 651: Which one is more effective, guerrilla warfare or regular warfare?

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    Listening to the officers under his command happily talking about the advantages of guerrilla warfare, Li Guoyao couldn't help but raise the corners of his mouth!

    But when he heard that most people thought that guerrilla warfare was more powerful than regular warfare, Li Guoyao knew that he was wrong. He immediately cleared his throat and said, "There is no need to argue about the advantages and disadvantages of guerrilla warfare and regular warfare.  Because there is absolutely no comparison between the two!¡±

    "Why, Commander, I feel like this guerrilla warfare is more effective than regular tactics!" Xie Baojun said.

    "That's because the environment has changed, so you have this illusion. In fact, both guerrilla warfare and regular warfare have merits and shortcomings, because they adapt to different battlefields!"

    Then Li Guoyao continued: "Regular combat is about fighting for every inch of territory and keeping the enemy outside the country's gates, so the focus is on consumption and large-scale offense and defense. For example, after the outbreak of the All-out War of Resistance, the first battle on the frontal battlefield  A major battle, the Battle of Songhu, fully reflected the strategic and tactical characteristics of the Kuomintang army. The Battle of Songhu was a frontal battle in which the National Army took the initiative to launch an offensive. Its purpose was to launch an offensive in Shanghai before the Japanese could react.  The offensive can first eliminate the Japanese army in Shanghai with an overwhelming force advantage and remove the threat to the capital Nanjing. It can also force the Japanese army to mobilize prematurely and break its rhythm of gradually encroaching from north to south in North China. If these intentions can be realized, from  Strategically speaking, launching the Battle of Songhu is a clever move to seize the initiative."

    "Strategically speaking, this plan is very creative, but the use of troops and tactics of the national army are really bad. The three most elite German divisions, the assault forces that are best at field warfare, have been devoted to urban assault; while in the city  In the street fighting, a dense formation of battalion and company size was used to charge in a group on the narrow streets. The bravest is brave, but the sacrifices under the intensive firepower of the Japanese army can only be in vain. Therefore, even after ten days of fighting, the Japanese army in Shanghai could not be completely eliminated.  A mere few thousand troops.¡±

    "As soon as the Japanese follow-up troops arrived, the battle situation reversed. In the subsequent offensive and defensive battles, it was unwise to blindly engage in positional warfare where every inch of land was contested, and to fight to the death with the Japanese army who had powerful sea and air firepower. In the end,  We paid a huge price of 250,000 casualties and still could not hold Shanghai."

    "And this kind of rigid defensive tactics was repeated again and again in the early days of the Anti-Japanese War. It is true that if the government army easily abandons its territory without resisting, it will be a heavy blow to the international outlook and the image of the government and the army, and it will also be extremely detrimental to the morale of the people.  However, if we blindly adopt a positional warfare in which a sea of ??people resists a sea of ??fire, in the end both people and the land will be destroyed."

    Then Li Guoyao continued: "It is precisely because we have been defeated again and again in the frontal battlefield, not only losing troops but also losing generals, we have also gradually lost Shanghai, Nanjing, Xuzhou, Taiyuan, Wuhan and other places, and we lost Guangzhou some time ago, so everyone feels that regular combat is unbearable.  One blow is not advisable. But have you ever thought about what would happen if we also used guerrilla warfare on the frontal battlefield?"

    Li Guoyao¡¯s words silenced everyone at the scene. Yes, although regular combat will cause heavy casualties, this tactic is not necessarily impossible. Guerrilla warfare is also powerful and suitable for frontal battlefields.

    Think about the 16-character policy of guerrilla warfare: "When the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy is stationed, we harass; when the enemy is tired, we attack; when the enemy retreats, we pursue." This is no problem on the battlefield behind enemy lines, but if this tactic is also used on the frontal battlefield, then this  The war is over.

    When the Japs come, we should retreat. It may not take long for all the large and medium-sized cities in China to be occupied by the Japs. This is obviously not advisable.

    Seeing that everyone was lost in thought, Li Guoyao felt like he had a clear mind. The most fundamental reason why China has tactical theories such as regular warfare and guerrilla warfare is based on the Japanese army's strategy and the environment.

    During the eight years of the Anti-Japanese War, the Japanese army's strategy has always been criticized. Many people even believe that the Japanese army has no overall strategic plan at all and just slides on the watermelon rind.

    The reasons for this phenomenon are, on the one hand, the lack of far-sighted strategists in the Japanese army, and on the other hand, the Japanese army's bad habit of "subjugating the superior", which has ruined the little strategic planning it has.

    Comparatively speaking, the military quality of the grassroots officers and soldiers of the Japanese army is very high, so the tactical level is relatively high. Therefore, the evaluation of the Japanese army during World War II is that the tactics are first-rate and the strategy is poor.

    On the other hand, China, perhaps continuing its tradition of focusing on strategy, is indeed far superior to Japan in terms of its anti-war grand strategy.  Whether it was the Kuomintang on the frontal battlefield or the Red Party on the battlefield behind enemy lines, they all "invariably" put forward the grand strategy of protracted resistance.

    Since the war of resistance is going to last for a long time, we can¡¯t be in chaos by throwing hammers here and there.?.

    Especially after the December 8th Incident in 1932, Chiang Kai-shek realized the danger and immediately ordered He Yingqin to formulate the general outline of the anti-war plan as soon as possible. The core content was to "enrich all self-defense forces and prepare for long-term resistance in order to achieve final victory."

    By the end of 1936, Article A of the "National Defense Operation Plan for the 26th Year of the Republic of China" formulated by the General Staff Department of the Military Commission clearly stated: "The national army should have the will to resist resolutely and the belief in victory against enemy forces that bully the weak and rush in rashly.  Although we are fighting on the defensive, we should use our offensive spirit at all times to thwart the enemy's attempts to achieve the goals of the national army. As a last resort, we should engage in protracted warfare to gradually consume the enemy's combat effectiveness and take advantage of the opportunity to divert the offensive."

    After the outbreak of the all-out Anti-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek further clearly proposed the strategic policy of exchanging space for time and holding on for change based on the actual situation of the war.

    This point has been reflected in Lao Jiang¡¯s previous speeches, for example: ¡°In this war of resistance, we use the vast land to decide the outcome of the enemy; we use the large population to decide the enemy¡¯s life and death.¡±

    Another example: "We must use the vast space to hold on to the vast space for a long time, and use the vast space to extend the time of the war of resistance, to consume the enemy's strength and strive for the final victory."

    But as the Nationalist Government is a government force, their protracted war of resistance is destined not to be guerrilla action, but to fight for every inch of territory while focusing on grand strategy.

    However, the result is that the Japanese army is not good at strategy, but it is superior in specific tactics and military use. Therefore, in several major battles in the early stages of the Anti-Japanese War, the Chinese army was defeated steadily.

    On the other hand, due to the different location and environment in Yan'an, the strategy proposed is independent guerrilla warfare.

    Guerrilla warfare is the tradition of the Eighth Route Army. It is not very practical on the frontal battlefield, but on the battlefield behind enemy lines, guerrilla warfare is the main form of combat.

    But even within the Eighth Route Army, there were different views on guerrilla warfare at the beginning.  In the Eighth Route Army's first battle at Pingxingguan, the 115th Division had a strength advantage of seven times that of the enemy. On a battlefield with absolutely favorable terrain, the veterans who had been tested in many battles during the Long March faced the Japanese logistics troops with only a few combat troops covering them. The casualty exchange rate was almost one-to-one.  .

    The gap between the two sides in terms of equipment and soldier quality is evident. Therefore, it would be tantamount to suicide to use the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army to engage in positional combat with the Japanese army.

    After Pingxingguan, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army basically unified and formed a consensus on the tactical thinking of mainly adopting guerrilla warfare and not giving up positional warfare under favorable conditions.

    At the beginning, guerrilla warfare mainly relied on mountainous areas, because mountainous areas are the most favorable terrain for guerrilla warfare. Whether it is an offensive ambush or a defensive blockade, mountains can best promote the strengths of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army and restrain the shortcomings of the Japanese army.

    Later, it further developed from the mountains to the plains. The richer human and material resources in the plains can strengthen the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army and provide more sufficient material support for the guerrilla warfare in the mountains. The mountains have become the most reliable rear area in the plains. Both the mountains and the plains  The organic combination of the two developed guerrilla warfare to its peak.

    Due to its limited manpower resources, the Japanese army was unable to effectively control such a vast territory of China. It could only concentrate on ensuring large and medium-sized cities and major transportation lines. In this way, the vast number of small towns and villages became the places where the Japanese army had the weakest control.  , naturally became the place where the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army were most active, and also provided enough space for the development of guerrilla warfare.

    Starting from places beyond the control of the Japanese army, a solid base was gradually established.  When the Japanese army concentrated its forces to carry out mopping up operations in the base areas, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army usually left a small number of troops to deal with the Japanese army, and moved the main force to areas where the Japanese army was weak to attack the gaps created by the Japanese army's deployment of troops to mop up the base areas, forcing the Japanese army to finally give up the mopping up operations.  .  (Remember the website address: www.hlnovel.com
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